

227-3068

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NATIONAL SURVIVAL—RACIAL IMPERATIVE

BY

COLONEL LOUIS O. GIUFFRIDA
MILITARY POLICE CORPS



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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Colonel Louis O. Giuffrida
Military Police Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
25 February 1970

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SUMMARY

Racial prejudice is not an inherent or natural trait. Prejudice is a learned reaction that is undesirable when it is limited to a few individuals, but extremely dangerous when it reaches the level of group prejudice.

The white man's fear and hatred of the "Red Menace" resulted in the nearly total displacement of the Indians from their tribal lands to desolate reservations.

Group prejudice, hatred, and fear of the "Yellow Peril" led to the forced evacuation and detention of thousands of Japanese-American citizens during World War II.

There is a disturbing parallel between the "Yellow Peril" sentiment and the white/negro prejudice of today. Riots and racial violence have been the order of the day for the past ten years. Radical agitators, both black and white, are calling for armed rebellion to destroy American society as we now know it. Many whites fear physical harm from the blacks: many blacks fear that they, like the Japanese-American, will be forced into detention camps. Polarization of the races is becoming more and more pronounced. Additional violent racial confrontations are almost inevitable; many fear the violence will get completely out of control. There is an increasing demand for law and order and a commensurate loss of sympathy for dissenters.

The Army is and will continue to be profoundly influenced by the prevailing social conditions. The revolt against authority which characterizes the contemporary civilian scene is manifesting itself in the armed forces by an alarmingly serious attack upon the traditional concept of military discipline.

Large scale urban violence would surely involve the use of Army troops to restore order, particularly if the level of violence began to approach rebellion or insurrection. Would the fact that Army units committed to such duty naturally include a proportionate number of non-whites impair their effectiveness? Not significantly. Although there might be local incidents of disobedience within the ranks, the Army could be expected to perform effectively in any internal crisis. The Army might well serve as a model of racial harmony for the rest of our society.

CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

Prejudice has always been a factor in our society as, indeed, it has been in every society since time began.

Prejudices are not created by war or internal crisis: they are simply crystallized and intensified and surfaced.

War or internal strife brings to the crisis point relations between the societal majority and its ethnic and racial minorities. At the same time it creates tremendous pressures within the minority groups themselves. Individuals become extremely sensitive to the attitudes and treatment to which they are subjected. They are exposed to external and internal demands for declarations of their loyalty and sentiments. As the pressures increase the likelihood of rational action decreases: racial violence becomes virtually inevitable.

Nobody is born prejudiced. Prejudice is not an inherent or natural trait, anymore than it is endemic to one particular location, race, or religious group. Wherever prejudice is found, it is a manufactured thing kept alive by conscious effort.

Prejudice tends to grow stronger within each of us with each new personal encounter or experience with the object of our prejudice. As prejudiced persons influence more and more other people, they eventually build a group prejudice.

A small number of prejudiced activists can invariably build and maintain group prejudices.

Group prejudices do not remain at a constant level, but will vary in intensity as a function of the persistence of the agitators.

If the object of prejudice becomes identified as a physical threat, the feeling of personal insecurity and fear will raise group prejudice intensity to a level where violent counteractions will be taken.

While isolated individual prejudices are undesirable and annoying, they do not become dangerous until they are joined into a group prejudice. The longer a group prejudice lasts, the stronger it becomes until, finally, it becomes a part of the group mores.

By 1920 the people of California had been thoroughly trained to hate the Japanese and other oriental people. The people of California had heard the anti-Japanese charges from prominent citizens, from politicians, from the lecture platform, read them in newspapers and magazines, seen them on billboards and restaurant signs and automobile windshield stickers, and heard them argued and re-argued in every political campaign in the state for the past thirty years. For three decades they lived in an atmosphere of racial consciousness until it had almost become a part of their thinking.¹

Some prejudices can be found in every group: labor groups, newspaper publishers, educators, doctors, clergymen, school boards, cities, states, et cetera ad infinitum.

Difficult as it is to build and maintain a group prejudice, it obviously can be done and has been done. The results have invariably been devastating, not only for the agitators but for the rest of the population: intellectual and moral bewilderment, divisiveness, acrimony, and violence.

¹Carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese-Americans (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945).

During a time of war, be it hot or cold, divisiveness and bewilderment of this type constitute serious danger to the security of the nation and become a matter of grave concern for the entire citizenry.

CHAPTER II

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN

On 12 October 1492 Christopher Columbus shattered forever the relatively uncomplicated existence the American Indians had led for thousands of years. In the report of his first trip Columbus wrote:

The lands . . . are all most beautiful. The people . . . are artless and generous with what they have, to such a degree as no one would believe . . . of anything they have, if it be asked for, they never say no, but do rather invite the person to accept it.¹

The following year Columbus returned to Santo Domingo with 17 ships and 1,500 land-hungry colonists. Each year brought more hundreds of settlers seeking a fortune in mining and in plantations established on lands seized from the Indians.

The Spanish rulers and colonists operated on the thesis that the discovery and military occupation of a territory constituted legal sovereignty. The conquered territory was considered abandoned land (*res nullius*) and, since no sovereignty had existed before possession by conquest, rightful ownership went to the conquering military forces. The inhabitants of the conquered territories, since their rights were not defended by the force of a civilized law, were considered as comparable to beasts of burden, ergo born to be enslaved. According to the doctrine the Indians were obviously inferior to the Spaniards physically, morally, and intellectually, and they ought to be regarded by the

¹Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Indians (New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1968), p. 29.

Spaniards "much as children are regarded by adults, women by men, the savage and cruel by the clement, and monkeys by their masters."²

The Spanish Emperor established a system of encomienda in the New World. The encomienda was the delegation of Indians to the control of deserving Spaniards. The encomendero was obligated to care for and Christianize the Indians, while the Indians were obliged to work a number of days each week for the encomendero.

The Indians, however, showed a singular lack of interest in working for the Spaniards, while the Spanish priests complained that the Indians could not be converted to Christianity unless they were forced into congregations. It was not too long before the Indians were forced into villages under Spanish jurisdiction so that they could stay congregated, and work and worship in a proper manner! The first Indian reservations had been established. Some of the Indians tried to fight the Spaniards, others fled to other islands, and thousands died of diseases that had been brought to America by the colonists. By 1513 there were 17 Spanish towns on Santo Domingo. By 1513 the Indian population had been reduced from an estimated 250,000 to about 14,000.

By 1542 the Spaniards had crossed the Mississippi and reached what is now Oklahoma--always in search of new lands and greater profits. Their treatment of and attitude toward the Indians generally followed the pattern established at Santo Domingo.

The search for profit was also the basic colonial Indian policy

²Ricardo Gallardo, "Defender of the Indians," Americas Magazine, (October 1966), p. 29.

in non-Spanish North America. Tobacco was the first real source of profit. By the early 17th century the smoking habit was sweeping across all of England. Tobacco became the Virginia Colony's sole export item. The expanding tobacco market required an ever-increasing acreage, but the tobacco farming techniques of the day depleted the soil and new fields had to be found every few years. The colonists quickly decided it was easier to seize fields from the Indians than it was to clear new land.

The official policy, founded entirely on economic conditions, regarded the Indians as less valuable than their lands; there were no laws to protect the Indians from being exploited or even destroyed.

In 1790 the United States signed a treaty with the Creek Indians of the Southeast. The Creeks ceded certain lands north of the 31st Parallel, and the United States guaranteed the safety of the remaining Creek nation--approximately 84,000 square miles covering what is now highlands Georgia and its environs. By 1791 the colonists were casting covetous glances at the Creek Territory, bemoaning the fact that the Indians had it, and stating that it must become "a most delectable part of the United States . . . well suited to the culture of corn, wine, oil, silk, hemp, rice, wheat, tobacco, indigo, every species of fruit trees, and English grass."²

In 1817 President James Monroe wrote, "The hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory to sustain it, than is compatible with the progress and just claims of civilized life . . . and must yield to it."

²Joseply, Indians, p. 213.

³Ibid., p. 203.

From the lands of the Southeastern Indians were formed Mississippi (1817), Georgia (1819), and Alabama (1819). In violation of the US treaties with the Indians, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama passed legislation outlawing tribal governments and placing the Indian nations under state law. When the Indians asked the Federal Government for help, they were told by President Jackson that the Federal Government was unable to comply with its treaty pledges. Jackson, who shared the prevailing anti-Indian feeling, urged the Indians to sign new treaties in which the Indians would agree to give up all of their tribal lands and be evacuated to reservations west of the Mississippi River. The various states passed laws prohibiting a court from accepting the testimony of an Indian against a white man, so that every claim brought by a white man against an Indian could not legally be contested.

In 1836 and 1838 and again in 1839, the US Army removed the Indians from their tribal lands by force.

The Indians were never able to understand the white man's desire for land. The Indian believed that the land was the common property of his tribe. Not only did it provide his food and game, it also gave a special identity to his entire life. He belonged to that particular land.

The Europeans, on the other hand, came to America with the long established conviction that land ownership was a civil right, guaranteed to the individual who farmed or worked the land. Ownership meant sole use and trespassers moved at their own peril. The white man wanted the land; the Indian stood in his way--the Indian had to go even if it meant totally destroying the Indian tribes.

From 1835 to 1842 thousands of militiamen and the majority of the Regular Army worked together to force the Seminoles out of Florida and onto reservations west of the Mississippi. The list goes on endlessly and need not be reiterated here. The point is clear: group prejudice against the Indians had become implacable racial hatred. The white man ruthlessly displaced the Indian minority to reservations, then systematically took away the reservations as land values went up. There seemed to be a national callousness toward the extermination of the Indians. Atrocities that make the alleged massacre at My Lai pale into insignificance brought heaps of praise upon the "heroes." The Reverend J. M. Chivington, Colonel of Colorado Volunteers, ordered his 1,000 volunteers to "kill and scalp all big and little; nits make lice." The orders were carried out enthusiastically against 325 unsuspecting Cheyenne women, children, and old men at Sand Creek. The result was a war which cost the government \$30,000,000 and spread death and destruction throughout the border settlements.

In 1887 the Congress passed the so-called Allotment Act. Under its provisions the Indians were to surrender their reservations, parts of which would then be allotted to individual Indians as small farms--from 10 to 640 acres each. All remaining reservation land was declared surplus, bought at a token price, and opened to white ownership. Sixty percent of the Indians' land (over 90 million acres), most of it guaranteed by treaties less than 30 years old, was taken from the tribes.

In 1879 the New York Herald was still calling for extermination of the Indians, saying editorially, "the continent is getting too crowded."⁴

⁴Ibid., p. 348.

By the turn of the 20th century the displacement of the Indians to reservations was virtually completed and the average white American no longer feared the "Red Menace." In 1924 the United States Congress extended citizenship to all Indians born in the United States.

Almost four hundred treaties were made between the Indians and the United States Government: the United States Government broke all but three or four of them.⁵ The Indian never really had a hope of withstanding the pressure of the white majority determined to seize and hold Indian land.

⁵Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, United States Senator from Hawaii, in personal interview, Washington, D.C., 8 November 1969.

CHAPTER III

EARLY HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES

PREJUDICE AGAINST ORIENTALS

Glossary

Isei - Persons born in Japan and who, until 1952, were denied citizenship in the United States.

Nisei - American citizens of Japanese parentage.

Sansei - American citizens born of Nisei parents.

Kibei - Nisei who received at least part of their education in Japan.

In August 1610, ten years before the Mayflower brought the Pilgrims to the east coast of North America, the first Japanese ship known to have crossed the Pacific Ocean reached the Mexican port of Acapulco. The voyage was part of a plan to establish direct trade between "New Spain" (Mexico) and Japan.¹

In 1613 another Japanese ship took a delegation of Japanese Christians to Acapulco. Some members of this group chose to remain in Mexico when the ship returned to Japan, thus becoming the first Japanese immigrants to America. No more is known of them, which suggests their successful assimilation into the life and culture of Mexico with ultimate loss of racial identity.

It is interesting to consider that Japan had a perfect opportunity to take possession of California. The Spanish did not settle in San

¹The period that preceded Japan's voluntary isolation from the rest of the world is detailed from official documents of both Mexico and Japan in Volume 4, Number 1, the University of California Publications on American Archeology and Ethnology.

Diego until 1769 and explorers of other nations had not yet reached the West Coast. Instead of expanding her empire, however, Japan in 1638 began a policy of strict exclusion and inclusion; prohibited the construction of anymore seaworthy ships; destroyed those she already had, and withdrew from the world until Commodore Perry forced his way into the country in 1853. The self-isolation of Japan was ordered by the Tokugawa Shoguns who were convinced that foreign Christian missionaries were a menace to the safety of the Empire. It was not until 1884 that the Japanese Government permitted mass emigration.

Before 1860, when Japan sent her first embassy to the United States, the few Japanese who had been seen by Americans were castaways who had been picked up in midocean by western ships and brought to America (usually to California) until they could be returned to Japan.

In the late 1860s there appeared in California two small colonies of Japanese. One was composed of about a dozen farmers who settled on land they bought near Sacramento. These farmers had been smuggled out of Japan by a Dutchman who hoped to make a fortune out of raising tea and silkworms in the Sacramento Valley. The Dutchman returned to Japan for more supplies but was caught and executed for breaking the inclusion law. The stranded Sacramento farmers managed to find work in American families.

The other colony consisted of a small group of Japanese liberals and intellectuals. According to a contemporary report in the San Francisco Chronicle, all of them were

. . . Gentlemen of refinement and influence in their own country, from which they were compelled to flee, almost destitute, because their travel in civilized

countries had made them too liberal in their ideas to suit the Mikado. These Japanese gentlemen, who speak English and French, offered to work for nothing for a year with any gentlemen who would learn them a useful occupation, but could get none to accept their services. By the advice of Mr. Van Reed they leased a farm in Alameda County, and hired a few intelligent white men to instruct them.²

Until 1884, just prior to the authorization of general emigration by Japan, there were 80 Japanese in California.

To summarize: until general emigration of Japanese got underway, the majority of the Japanese in California came from the educated and upper classes. It is apparent that most of the population was kindly disposed toward the new settlers.

Until the turn of the 20th century movements of Japanese to the United States were on a small scale. In the first decade of the 20th century mass migrations reached their highest point but dropped drastically after 1908 when the Gentlemen's Agreement to limit the migration of Japanese to Hawaii and the United States became effective.³

These 20th century immigrants took up life in a section of the United States which by this time was extremely hostile to Orientals. West Coast color prejudice began to take shape in 1846 when a group of white Americans went to California, then Mexican territory, to grab what property they could when the US annexed California. These Americans and the Mexicans in California got involved in a quarrel which was known as the Bear Flag Rebellion. The rallying cry for the Americans was

²War Relocation Authority, Wartime Exile (Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 5.

³An accord between the United States and Japan, whereby the Japanese Government agreed to limit the migration of Japanese laborers to the United States.

"California for the Americans." The term "American" was defined to exclude Spanish and Mexican Californians, as well as Mexican and American Indians.⁴

At the time the Japanese began to arrive in any number, there was an unskilled labor shortage. As long as they remained unskilled laborers, the Japanese immigrants were welcomed even by the racists. The Japanese immigrants, however, were not content to remain forever as unskilled laborers. They took unskilled labor while they learned the language and the American mode of life, but their whole effort was pointed toward escaping from the migratory labor gangs to leased or purchased land of their own so that they could bring over their families from Japan and lead a normal American life. Many Californians disapproved of this ambition on the part of the Japanese immigrants. White farmers resented having their harvest hands suddenly become competing farm operators, though it is likely that much of their initial resentment was economic rather than racist. The racists, however, viewed the transition from day laborer to farm operator as a planned threat to white supremacy.

Japan's victory over Russia (1905) added fuel to the California anti-Japanese crusade. Japan had shown the world that a small group of Asiatic islands was fast becoming a world power. From that point on, the anti-Japanese forces of the West Coast began to associate the growing racial minority in the United States with the rise of Japanese nationalism.

⁴War Relocation Authority, California and Her Less Favored Minorities (Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 6.

They began to identify the Japanese immigrants with the native Japanese militarists and warned of a long range scheme to conquer California by means of extensive colonization and prodigious propagation.

The San Francisco Chronicle began a series of scare stories against the Japanese immigrants with a lead story on 23 February 1905. M. H. Deyoung, the owner of the Chronicle, had been a candidate for the United States Senate a few years previously and it is likely that these vicious articles were a renewal of his candidacy.⁵ By 1 March 1905 the California Legislature had unanimously passed a resolution demanding that the US Congress immediately stop further immigration of Japanese laborers.

In 1908 the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect. In 1908 the Japanese Exclusion League had its first annual convention in Seattle. By 1908 the Japanese Exclusion League had chapters in most of the western states: California alone had 110,000 members.⁶

The Japanese Exclusion League took strong exception to the Gentlemen's Agreement because it placed the responsibility for limiting immigration with the Japanese Government. Though it was never written, the agreement provided that Japan would issue passports only to nonlaborers, with the exception of those laborers who had established residence in the United States and wished to return, and to the immediate families of those laborers. Japan extended the terms to include Mexico and Canada. The Japanese Exclusion League denounced the Agreement on the basis that Japan did not really administer it in good faith, though, in

⁵Carey McWilliams, Prejudice (Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1945), p. 19.

⁶War Relocation Authority, Wartime Exile, p. 15.

fact, all the evidence points to the opposite conclusion.⁷

In 1909 the California Legislature proposed a law to prohibit the purchase of land by Japanese aliens; only the personal interference and influence of President Taft prevented its passage.

In the California general elections of 1910 all the political parties had anti-Japanese planks in their platform. In 1913, despite all pleas from the White House, the California Legislature passed the first alien land act, which made it illegal for aliens ineligible for citizenship to buy agricultural land or to lease it for a period in excess of three years. It also prohibited these aliens from owning more than 49 percent of the stock in any organization which owned or leased agricultural land.⁸

In 1920 an initiative land law tightened up the law of 1913 by forbidding altogether the leasing of land by Japanese aliens; it took away their right to buy any stock in an organization which owned or leased agricultural land; and it prohibited aliens from being appointed guardians of minor children whose estate consisted of real property--this last restriction because some Japanese aliens were buying land in the name of their citizen children. In 1923 the law was amended to prohibit Japanese aliens from making share-cropping contracts.

In 1925 the California State Attorney General, U. S. Webb, succeeded in getting the legislature to pass a concurrent resolution urging investigation of alleged infractions of the alien land acts. Webb had been

⁷Ibid., p. 14.

⁸War Relocation Authority, California and Her Less Favored Minorities, p. 20.

one of the authors of the alien land acts and was a permanent member of the California Joint Immigration Commission, organized to campaign for Federal legislation to exclude the Japanese from the United States. The Institute of Pacific Relations said of the California Joint Immigration Commission:

The most powerful single group in California . . . is the California Joint Immigration Commission, successor to the defunct exclusion leagues, whose Executive Secretary and driving force, Mr. V. S. McClatchy, was formerly Director of the Associated Press when he was editor and owner of the Sacramento Bee. Largely the initiative and publicity skill of Mr. McClatchy has been responsible for the legislative acts against the Japanese since the World War (I). The Committee consists of the Deputy-Adjutant of the American Legion, the Secretary-Treasurer of the State Federation of Labor, Master of the State Grange, Grand President of the Native Sons of the Golden West, the State Attorney General, and V. S. McClatchy.⁹

The Joint Commission was instrumental in the passage of the immigration law of 1924 with its rider which excluded the Japanese. Mr. McClatchy prepared a skeleton brief which was filed with the US Secretary of State and then presented to the US Senate by Senator Hiram Johnson of California on 27 July 1921. The skeleton brief

. . . rested the case for excluding the Japanese on falsifications of the volume of Japanese population in California, the Japanese birth rate in California, the alleged failure of Japan to observe in good faith the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, and the excessive number and acreage of Japanese freeholds and leaseholds in the State.¹⁰

The Immigration Act of 1924 annulled the Gentlemen's Agreement by denying admission to the United States of all immigrants ineligible for citizenship

⁹Report of Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Honolulu, July 1927).

¹⁰War Relocation Authority, Wartime Exile, p. 16.

and including in that category "Mongolians, Polynesians . . . and races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere."

DECISION

In 1921 the Chairman of the Exclusion League (concurrently the Comptroller of the State of California) announced that the next goal to be achieved by his group, after further immigration should be prohibited, was "the amending of the Constitution of the United States to the effect that children born in this country of parents ineligible for citizenship, themselves shall be ineligible for citizenship."¹¹

The campaign to enact such a change to the Constitution depended for success upon its ability to totally discredit the reliability, patriotism, and citizenship of the Nisei. The anti-Japanese forces began a highly publicized attack on Japanese language schools and the "evils" of dual citizenship. It was claimed that all American-born children of Japanese parents automatically held dual citizenship (US and Japan). Further that dual citizenship implied dual allegiance with first allegiance to Japan as the country of ancestry rather than to the United States as the country of birth. It was charged that Japanese law claimed every child of a Japanese father as a Japanese citizen and that all such children had to be loyal to the Emperor of Japan. It was made to appear that among the numberless thousands of second-generation US citizens only the Nisei were faced with conflicting loyalties.

A lengthy discussion of citizenship laws is not germane to this

¹¹Ibid., p. 30.

paper. Suffice it to say that the United States has never recognized the claim of any other nation to the allegiance of an American-born child.* If the country of his ancestry also claims him as a citizen regardless of his place of birth, the child can be said to involuntarily hold dual citizenship. By American law the duality is meaningless and normally becomes an issue only when other American citizens choose to distort and misrepresent the facts.

The attempt to amend the Constitution never succeeded but it was extremely successful in creating suspicion of the Nisei.

The attack on Pearl Harbor caused an immediate increase in the charges against the Japanese Americans. The anti-Japanese forces in California insisted upon immediate total removal of all Japanese from their state. One of the major points in their arguments was dual citizenship. The Hearst newspapers printed vitriolic editorials and warned against the "Yellow Peril."

The Department of Justice is responsible for controlling enemy aliens within the United States in time of war. On 7 December 1941 President Roosevelt ordered the Army to help the FBI round up individual enemy aliens who were considered actually or potentially dangerous. By 13 December 1941 a total of 595 Japanese and 187 German aliens from the Pacific states had been interned.¹²

On 19 December 1941, apparently as one result of the anti-Japanese agitation, the Western Defense Command sent the following message to Washington:

* The exception is children born in embassies.

¹²War Relocation Authority, WRA, A Story of Human Conservation (Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 7.

1. In view of the fact that the West Coast of the United States has now been designated and is functioning as an active Theater of Operations, it is recommended that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations, and remove them to the Zone of the Interior.

2. It is also recommended that these individuals be held under restraint after removal from the Theater of Operations in order to preclude their surreptitious return.

3. Records indicate that there are approximately 40,000 of such enemy aliens and it is believed that they constitute an immediate and potential menace to vital measures of defense.¹³

The term "alien" as used in this message included Germans and Italians as well as Japanese.

Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, the Commander of the Western Defense Command, was initially opposed to an evacuation of citizens. In his own words, "An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they may not all be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary."¹⁴

Attorney General Biddle was also absolutely opposed to any indiscriminate internment or relocation of US citizens. All records searched seem to indicate that almost every responsible military officer and civilian official involved was initially opposed to evacuation of anyone other than aliens who were known to be friendly with the enemy. The insistence upon mass evacuation came from citizen groups on the West Coast. Their spokesmen in Washington were Senator Hiram Johnson (California), Senator Rufes C. Holman (Oregon), and Senator Mon C. Walgren (Washington).

¹³Western Defense Command, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (Washington, 1943), underscoring added.

¹⁴War Department AG File 014.311 (1-12-41).

On 4 and 5 January 1942, the Justice Department and the War Department agreed on the following expanded control measures:

(1) immediate registration of all aliens.

(2) FBI search of any premise if, in the opinion of the FBI agent, there was reasonable cause to believe there was contraband on the premises.

(3) designation of strategic areas from which the Attorney General could bar all aliens, with Army recommendations to be given first priority consideration.

On 29 January 1942 General DeWitt, Governor C. L. Olson of California, and Earl Warren, Attorney General of California, agreed that all Japanese should be removed from California. In Washington, meanwhile, the California Congressional delegation was applying tremendous pressure for evacuation.¹⁵

On 1 February 1942 the Attorney General of the United States stated

The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race.¹⁶

On 6 February 1942 the Provost Marshal General (Gullion) recommended that steps be taken immediately to eliminate what he called the great danger of Japanese-inspired sabotage on the West Coast. General Gullion stated that the Army should intern, in areas east of the Sierra Nevada mountains, all Japanese aliens together with as many citizen members of their families as would voluntarily accompany them. He further

¹⁵Nation, October 11, 1958.

¹⁶Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1942, p. II-1, underscoring added.

recommended the exclusion of all citizen Japanese from restricted areas and their resettlement with the assistance of various Federal agencies.¹⁷

On 9 February 1942 Secretary of War Stimson spoke with President Roosevelt on the telephone and having described to him the difference of opinion "fortunately found that he was very vigorous about it and told me to go ahead on the line that I had myself thought best."¹⁸

On 13 February 1942 the Pacific Coast Congressional subcommittee on Aliens and Sabotage sent President Roosevelt a strongly worded recommendation that

. . . all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or criminal to the defense of the United States . . . be evacuated from all strategic areas.

The term "strategic areas" included the States of California, Oregon, and Washington, and the Territory of Alaska.¹⁹

On 19 February 1942 it was decided at a GHQ staff meeting not to concur in General DeWitt's recommendation that all Japanese should be removed from California. Later that same day, President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to remove both aliens and citizens from areas that he might designate.²⁰

On 21 March 1942 the President signed Public Law 503, which put teeth into the enforcement of the new evacuation program. Although the law dealt with all aliens, it made special provisions for Italian and

¹⁷Western Defense Command, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, p. 23.

¹⁸Stimson Diary, entry of February 11, 1942.

¹⁹War Relocation Authority, Wartime Exile, p. 128.

²⁰Ibid., p. 137.

German aliens so that, in fact, only Japanese were involved. By late May 1942 most of the 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were confined in assembly areas. By November 1942 practically all of the Japanese--without being charged with any specific crime and without hearings--were evacuated under military guard to isolated detention camps in the interior of the United States. A majority of the Supreme Court of the United States (Korematsu vs United States) held that the evacuation was within the constitutional power of the Federal Government. The Court's failure to rule upon the constitutionality of the detention has generally been accepted as evidence of the legality of the detention.²¹

The evacuation idea was originated by prejudiced individuals and extremely biased minority groups which included:

(1) active racists who had been trying for years to expel the Japanese from the West Coast.

(2) the extreme right-wing newspapers, particularly those in California.

(3) the white supremacists who were totally anti-Oriental, not just anti-Japanese.

(4) politicians long associated with the prejudiced elements (like Hiram Johnson) who finally forced the issue in Washington, D.C.

Not to be overlooked are those minority groups who had definite economic advantages to gain and who had been trying for years to force the Japanese farmers, florists, and shipper-growers out of business. The evacuated people left behind them about \$250,000,000 worth of real,

²¹Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, op. cit.

personal, and commercial property. Most of this property was lost to unscrupulous whites who "methodically stole the evacuees blind."²²

The economic loss to the Japanese Americans was severe and in many instances, permanent.

The more than fifty years of anti-Japanese sentiment, the bias-building activity of certain minority groups, the race-baiting of some unscrupulous politicians had built a racial prejudice which, fanned by the attack on Pearl Harbor, quickly became mass hysteria and the prime motive for what has been called "the most serious and dramatic governmental manipulation to which an American population has been subjected in recent times."²³

²² War Relocation Agency, The Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property (Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 108.

²³ Paul F. Gerhard, The Plight of the Japanese-Americans During World War II (Wichita, Kansas, 1963), p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEGRO AMERICAN

All societies generate some discontent because organized life by its very nature inhibits most human beings. Group violence occurs when expectations about rights and status are continually frustrated and when peaceful efforts to press these claims yield inadequate results. It also occurs when the claims of groups who feel disadvantaged are viewed as threats by other groups occupying a higher status in society.¹

One can chart the changes in the relationships and attitudes between blacks and whites simply by reviewing the long history of racial violence in the United States. Slavery established the relationship of dominant and subservient, and the white master was legally entitled to use violence to enforce the relationship.

The black man was held in even lower regard than was the Indian. Where the Indian had land and other wealth coveted by the white man, the Negro had nothing. The Indian was considered a wild animal that presented a physical threat: the Negro was regarded more as an unruly beast of burden--sometimes balky but never threatening.

The Negro was accepted as

- (a) genetically inferior,
- (b) devoid of rights,
- (c) sexually promiscuous,
- (d) immoral,
- (e) incapable of self-sufficiency,
- (f) having limited wants because of his limited sensibilities.

The white man accepted without any fear the controlled resentment and hatred of the slave, confident that the threat of overwhelming white

¹Statement of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 3 December 1968.

physical force would make slaves think carefully before attempting to revolt. There were several attempts at slave rebellion, all of which failed. The mere fact that they had been tried, however, served to add legitimacy to the white use of violence for maintaining control over the slaves.

After the Civil War the pattern of violence changed. Vigilantes, Ku Klux Klaners, and others became an extralegal means of inflicting punishment, especially lynchings, and keeping Negroes "in line." In the peak year of 1892 there were 161 lynchings of Negroes, declining to 67 in 1910 and 20 in 1930. By 1963 lynching as a mode of racial violence had practically disappeared and no longer could be used as an index to race relations.

Late in the 19th century another pattern of racial violence emerged: riots in which white attackers hunted Negro victims. Usually whites sought to inflict personal injury on Negroes who normally did little to protect themselves or to counterattack. In 1908 the white community of Springfield, Illinois, infuriated by the alleged rapes by Negroes of two white women, began two days of rioting, burning, and lynching against the Negroes of the city. Most of the black residents fled from the city. It took 5,000 militiamen to restore some semblance of order. Riots of the same type occurred in Wilmington, North Carolina (1896); East Saint Louis, Illinois (1917); Washington, D.C. (1919); and Tulsa, Oklahoma (1921).²

The next pattern to develop was one in which each race sought to inflict physical harm on the other. On 27 July 1919, a negro boy drowned during an interracial dispute at a public beach in Chicago. A week of

²Louis H. Masotti and Jerome R. Corsi, Shoot-Out in Cleveland (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 94.

racial warfare followed. Though there was considerable property damage, the main objective of each side was physical harm. Thirty-eight people were killed (23 black and 15 white), while nearly 600 were injured. The National Guard was having difficulty in restoring order; it was extreme temperatures and rain which finally broke things up. The same type of race riot happened in Detroit in 1943. In less than three days of rioting 710 people were injured or killed. Both races participated in the rioting; the primary form of violence was physical attack.

The riots of the mid 1960s brought forth still another pattern. The riots were dominated by blacks and were oriented toward property. Negroes began the violence and directed most of their actions toward white-owned property located within the Negro ghetto rather than at white persons. Only infrequently did the violence spill beyond the borders of the negro area and the only white casualties normally were policemen trying to restore order. Negro mobs roamed the streets, breaking, burning, and looting.

Riots of this pattern occurred in several cities in 1967. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) concluded that:

. . . while the civil disorders of 1967 were racial in character, they were not interracial. The 1967 disorders, as well as earlier disorders of the recent period, involved action within Negro neighborhoods against symbols of American society--authority and property--rather than against white persons.

The evening of 23 July 1968 began like many others in the hot, humid ghetto area on Cleveland's East Side. Suddenly some shots rang out. Within minutes Cleveland police and black snipers were engaged in a full-scale fire fight. Ninety minutes later seven people were dead and fifteen others were wounded. Fifteen of the casualties were policemen.

For the next five days Cleveland's East Side was a battle area. Fire bombs were thrown into buildings; store windows were smashed and mobs of looters roamed the streets. The police fought back furiously. Before the rioting ended, 63 business establishments were damaged or destroyed and property damage surpassed \$2 million.

In that it produced bloodshed and property damage, the Cleveland riot was like most of its predecessors. The significant difference is that the Cleveland riot began as person-oriented violence, negroes and whites shooting at each other, snipers against police. It was apparently the first major riot that ended with more white casualties than black.

The Cleveland riot may well have been the start of the latest pattern in racial violence. A small, well-equipped group of black militant extremists was responsible for the bloodshed and dominated the entire period of violence. The serious alienation of many blacks from the white society is indicated by the fact that having a Negro mayor did not prevent the violence, nor were the Negro leaders able to stop the rioting once it started. The blacks, always a sizable but powerless and excluded minority, began to acquire a new image in the eyes of the white majority: for the first time many whites began to actively fear the blacks.

Militant negroes preach separatism and self-help in the black community: they advocate violence in retribution to the hostility of the "sick" white society. Sociologists studying the problem of urban violence have dispelled some myths that persist in the minds of many whites, a large number of public officials, and some Negroes.³

³T. M. Tomlinson, "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes," American Behavioral Scientists, (March-April 1968), p. 28.

1. It is a myth that only a small fraction (3% to 5%) of the Negroes living in the riot zones participated in the riots. The best estimates indicate that more than 15 percent of the ghetto residents participate in riots.

2. It is a myth that the overwhelming majority of the Negro community disapproves of those who supported the riots. At least 34 percent and perhaps as high as 50 percent expressed a sympathetic understanding of the views of the riot supporters.

3. It is a myth that most of the Negro community views the riots as a haphazard, meaningless event whose thrust was a disregard for law and order. On the contrary, 62 percent saw it as a Negro protest, 56 percent thought it had a purpose, and 38 percent described the riots in revolutionary rhetoric (revolution, revolt, insurrection). Sixty-four percent said the riot victims (whites) deserved attack.

4. It is a myth that Negroes expect and are afraid of white retaliation and a decline in relations between blacks and whites. Fifty-eight percent of the blacks expect favorable results from the riots.

Participation in and support of riots in the black communities are hardly positions of a small minority of malcontents. A large proportion of Negro citizens regard the riots as a legitimate protest against the actions of the whites, and they expect the riots to produce an improvement in the life of Negroes. Within this majority are groups of sophisticated, activist militants "who have given the riots political interpretations of purpose. They have created a riot ideology, and this ideology has infected the thinking of other less sophisticated but equally disaffected individuals."⁴ The riot potential remains a

⁴Ibid., p. 29.

dangerous undercurrent: most Negro leaders feel there will be more rioting.

White reaction has gone through fairly predictable phases. While many whites will agree that the Negro in America has more than ample reason to be bitterly discontented with his lot in life, there is hardly unanimity of opinion among the whites. Tolerance for the Negroes is highest among affluent whites farthest removed from the ghetto--and lowest among the poorer, less educated white city dweller. For the low income white the Negro represents a personal, direct challenge in schools, employment, and housing. He is not really convinced that the Negroes are discriminated against, and he resents bitterly the "white eggheads and college punks" who continue to push for Negro betterment at what he (the low income white) considers to be his expense.

The majority of whites believe the Negro is overreaching himself. An increasing majority (70%) think the Negroes "are trying to move too fast."⁵ Many whites who previously supported the Negroes have been alienated by the violence in the streets. There is an increasing tendency to condemn peaceful demonstrations as well as violent ones. Many middle class whites are worried about their personal safety because of Negro militancy.

What we see emerging is more and more resistance and reaction from the average white citizen, the so-called "Middle American," who feels he has always been the forgotten man of American society. For the past ten years the United States has been painfully aware of its alienated

⁵ Newsweek, October 6, 1969, p. 35.

minorities, the black militant, the welfare cases, the hippies, yippies, and campus revolutionaries. For the white middle class American it has been a decade of increasing frustration, disillusionment, and anger, and now he is starting to lash back. He wants a return to the traditional values of the sanctity of work and the stability of the family, of prayer and patriotism, and he is prepared to fight those who stand in his way. More and more he is identifying the "black malcontent" as the source of the problem. There is a nationwide surge toward "law and order."

The changing white middle class attitude could have momentous impact on the Negro. In Chicago, Negro marchers for equal housing ran into a hostile white crowd that pelted them with rocks, bottles, and firecrackers, chanting "Nigger, nigger, nigger." In Pittsburgh black demonstrators closed down fifteen major construction sites, demanding an increase in black membership in building-trade unions. Almost 3,000 white union members quickly set up a counterdemonstration and denounced the negro demands. The white fears the negro as an economic challenge. Even worse, the middle American is convinced that the cards are stacked against him and in favor of the Negro. A Gallup Poll completed in October 1969 showed the following Middle American attitudes:⁶

Do Negroes today have a better chance or worse chance than people like yourself--

	<u>Better</u>	<u>Worse</u>	<u>Same</u>
To get well-paying jobs?	44%	21%	31%
To get a good educ. for their children?	41%	16%	41%
To get good housing at reasonable cost?	35%	30%	27%
To get financial help from the government when they're out of work?	65%	4%	22%

⁶ Ibid.

Seventy-nine percent of the blue collar workers and 63 percent of the white collar workers feel that the Negroes "could have done something" about living conditions in the slums. Nearly one-third of the blue collar workers considered Negro demands (nationwide) as unjustified. Forty-nine percent of the blue collar group said blacks have a better chance than they do to get a good job.

The great majority of Middle Americans (84%) feel that there has been too lenient an attitude toward Negro dissenters and radicals, and they see this as the root problem. Part of the Middle American's resentment of the Negro is traceable to his belief that the white majority has been deserted by a government preoccupied with Negroes' needs. With equal vigor he detests the white liberals who lead peace marches, display the Viet Cong flag, and then retreat to the safety and seclusion of their homes in the totally white suburbs. And through it all comes an increasing demand for more "law and order." The previously mentioned Gallup Poll shows the following reactions among whites:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
1. The danger of racial violence is increasing.	58%	26%
2. Local police do a good job of preventing crime.	78%	16%
3. Police should have more power.	63%	35%
4. Suspects who might commit another crime before they come to trial should be held without bail.	68%	23%
5. Black militants have been treated too leniently.	85%	8%
6. College demonstrators have been treated too leniently.	84%	11%

Some Middle Americans are prepared to meet violence with greater violence. Ethnic groups are drawing closer together and freely expressing their hostility toward the Negroes. More and more expressions of black power bring forth immediate responses of counterpower. In Newark a fleet of 72 privately owned radio cars manned by white vigilantes

regularly patrol the white neighborhoods. The organizer of the Newark patrols is going to run for Mayor and is confident that his election is inevitable because "the people know I won't take any crap from any militants."

Eighty percent of the Middle Americans feel that they are being penalized by welfare payments to Negroes who could earn their own way if they tried.

In sharp contrast to the opinion of the white middle class, 82 percent of the Negro leadership feel the pace of social change is too slow. The greatest danger area continues to be the big city slums where a majority of the black residents feel they have made no progress, and 11 percent of the discontented are prepared to riot.

The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence warned recently that massive civil disobedience is not the way to cause laws to be changed but can instead lead to anarchy.

On 5 May 1968 the House Committee on Un-American Activities issued a report entitled "Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States." The report states that mixed Communist and black nationalist elements are planning and organizing paramilitary operations in the United States and it is their intent to instigate additional riots which will pave the way for a general revolutionary uprising fought along guerrilla warfare lines.

The report reviews data gathered by newspapers and magazines and developed by grand juries and other agencies, on the activities of groups that profess to be advocates of revolution by force and violence.

The report quotes extensively the leaders and official publications

of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the Revolutionary Contingent, and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Urban guerrilla fighters will "strike by night and spare none" when they launch their revolution in the United States, according to the quoted black militants. Their weapons will include Molotov cocktails, acid bombs, sniper rifles, phosphorous matches, hand grenades, machine guns, and poisoned darts.

Eldridge Cleaver speaks on TV and states his intention to shoot his way into the United States Senate, behead Senator McClellan, then shoot his way out again; newspapers and TV carry stories of still another shoot-out between the Black Panthers and the police, and each incident further intensifies the resentment and fear of large segments of the white population.

Ten years ago the vast majority of Americans would have scoffed at the idea of guerrilla warfare operations in the United States directed against our Government. Today there are many middle class citizens who no longer regard this idea as fantastic and ridiculous. Stokely Carmichael's statement "Our movement is progressing toward an urban guerrilla war within the United States itself" is no longer shrugged off as the wild ranting of a malcontent. As the fears of the whites increase so, proportionately, do their demands for law and order and for stiffer repression of militant groups.

Many blacks fear alleged white plans to place all Negroes into detention camps authorized by Title II of the so-called McCarran Act. "I see a ghetto perhaps cordoned off into a concentration camp," said Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., six days before he was killed.

I haven't said there was a move afoot, just that it is a possibility. The more there are riots, the more repression will take place, and the more we face the danger of a right-wing take-over, and eventually a Fascist Society. The Black Nationalist groups are absolutely convinced that the U.S. Government is preparing concentration camps for them.⁷

Black ghetto dwellers view the concentration camps as the logical, inevitable extension of white racism and belligerence. Nor are their fears allayed by the Administration's announcement that it is seeking repeal of the McCarran Act. In today's simmering mood of distrust and tension people are most receptive to those rumors which reinforce their own disillusionments about our society and culture. Complete polarization of the races seems to be more and more inevitable. Is the country headed toward a repetition of the evacuations and detentions of World War II?

⁷Look, May 28, 1968, p. 86.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In the past decade the United States has had an epidemic of confrontations in which outbreaks of bitter racial violence have brought death and destruction and widened the gap between Negro and white. Inevitably, the rising tensions and mutual distrust have led to more violence and disruption.

For purposes of discussion let us assume that racial relations have degenerated to the point where armed militants embark on a massive, violent attempt to immobilize the normal routine of a large city. The militants have occupied the city hall, taken over the mayor's office, and are shooting at police attempting to oust them. An extremely militant Black Nationalist group has seized the main radio stations and has been calling on all sympathizers to arm themselves and "join the people's revolution."

As soon as the violence starts, there are similar, though not necessarily preplanned, outbreaks of violence in other cities across the entire nation. The level of violence has quickly exceeded the control capacity of the various state and local agencies. Federal troops have been requested and are already committed. Fierce fighting is taking place in several major cities and intelligence reports indicate the disorder is likely to spread still further. Large number of United States

troops are still committed overseas and cannot be readily recalled to the United States. To further complicate the problem, white vigilante groups have surfaced and are taking independent counteractions against blacks--without too much attempt to discriminate between militant and nonmilitant.

The situation continues to deteriorate and the President is being bombarded with demands that he declare a state of national emergency or insurrection and use all of his emergency powers to restore law and order and punish the violators. Some highly placed persons in the Government are urging the President to declare martial law. A prominent Southern Senator has been assassinated and there have been attempts on the lives of other Governmental leaders.

There are persistent rumors that self-exiled militant leaders have returned to the United States and are in active control of the dissidents. It is also widely rumored that alien powers are providing arms and support to the militants.

In such an environment it is nearly impossible for the usual interracial contacts to continue. Blacks and whites who have worked side by side for years are now suspicious of each other. Many businesses in cities not yet hit by violence are closing their doors in an attempt to forestall damage.

More and more whites are murmuring "we ought to lock up all the Negroes until we can sort out the trouble makers among them." It is difficult to tell what is truth, part truth, or wild rumor.

Faced by mounting death and destruction, as well as increasing demands that he do so, the President reluctantly declares a state of

national emergency and puts the entire country on a war basis. The previously murmured suggestion that all Negroes be locked up now swells to a roar. It is like 1941 again, except that now it is the "Black Peril" rather than the "Yellow Peril."

In the extremely unlikely event that the government were to order the evacuation and detention of all blacks from actual or potential trouble spots, how and by whom would the order be enforced? What are the yardsticks for collecting, evacuating, and interning either militant or pacifistic minority groups; or dissident, potentially disloyal elements; or law-abiding citizens whose only offense is accident of color? Where would the internees be kept? The Federal prison population has already swollen beyond capacity, and the states prison systems are no better prepared to receive a large increase in population. What would be done with the blacks in the Armed Forces and in civil service and in Congress? The task would be far too large for the Justice Department; it would have to be greatly augmented by military forces, primarily from the United States Army.

The World War II evacuation and detention of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was marked by a complete lack of any form of resistance, yet it took 223 days and \$80 million to evacuate 109,650 internees from the West Coast to ten relocation camps in the interior. It cost nearly \$11 million to build fifteen assembly centers for preliminary processing and almost \$57 million to build the ten permanent camps. The program required seven thousand employees from seven departments, five agencies, as well as the purposely created War Relocation Authority which operated 43 control stations and 48 administrative offices.

The task was facilitated by the fact that prior to relocation most of the Japanese Americans were living in two states--

California	93,717
Washington	14,565
Arizona	632
Oregon	4,071
Idaho	1,191
Montana	508
Nevada	470
Utah	2,210
Rest of USA	3,381

One or more military police companies was assigned to each of the 15 assembly centers. In addition, troops were required for security purposes in the control stations and as escorts for bus and train movements. One military police company was allocated to each of the ten relocation centers for external security and, if needed, to serve as a riot control force within the relocation camp.

When the evacuation of the Japanese Americans was at its peak level, 3,750 people were being moved each day from their homes to assembly centers or relocation camps. Given the same processing organization and technique, it would take more than 14 years to process the 21,000,000 American Negroes.

If, more realistically, the evacuation order was limited to militants, and if one accepts as valid the minimum estimate of their own strength made by the militant groups, the figure drops to about 500,000 people--none of whom is likely to go peacefully to an internment camp. Without commenting on the social and moral impact on the country, the administrative and logistical implications are staggering.

FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, provides the most readily available method of estimating the number and types of

military police and other units that would be required for a mission of this type:

Civilian internment camps are operated by military police PW units. Civilian internment camps are operated in the same manner as PW camps, with due regard to the fundamental differences between the two classes of enemy personnel. For example, due consideration is given to the age, physical condition, and the ability of civilians to adjust to the conditions of internment. Also, separate quarters are provided for family groups when the internment of more than one member of a family is necessary.

A civilian internee (PW) camp can handle 12,000 internees. Given 500,000 internees it would take two Military Police PW Commands, each supervising ten such internee camps. In addition to the headquarters elements for the two PW commands, it would require 22 MP battalions and at least two MP PW processing companies. It would also be necessary to establish something similar to a Branch US PW Information Center. Not included in this estimate are the doctors, dentists, and other support elements that would be required. (See Figure 1.)

Internment camps would have to/^{be}built. FM 101-10-1 construction-time estimates for internee (PW) camps are based on four standards of permanence. Standard 2, the lowest, is described as follows:

Tents with earthen floors for all facilities.
Bucket-type latrines. Engineer effort required
for construction of security fencing, guard
towers, and stabilized roads. Open ditch drainage.

In order to insure maximum security of internees, current Army doctrine prescribes that a type internee (PW) camp should consist of three 4,000-man enclosures, each enclosure to have eight 500-man compounds. (Memories of the fiasco at Koje Do are still vivid!) It takes 60,860 manhours to build a Standard 2 enclosure with a 4,000-man




Figure 1

capacity. At a conservative estimate, therefore, it would take 182,580 manhours for each Standard 2 internment camp.




Figure 2

The further one probes into the matter, the more complex and disturbing are its implications. There are those who feel that the entire explosive subject is largely academic because even those militants who are urging riot and violence know that guerrilla warfare in the United States is totally illogical and doomed to failure. Furthermore, the

Government would never order evacuation and detention of militants under any circumstances because such an order would be unwise and probably unconstitutional.

Unfortunately, the most persistent and radical of the militant agitators have not always behaved in a logical and rational manner. Overestimating their logic and rationality could be as serious an error as underestimating the fanaticism of their revolutionary beliefs.

Governmental action must be kept in proper perspective. A governmental action may be:

- a. wise and constitutional;
- b. wise but unconstitutional;
- c. unwise but constitutional;
- d. unwise and unconstitutional.

A majority of the Supreme Court of the United States held that the evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II was within the constitutional power of the Federal Government (Korematsu vs United States).

The Government has historically had the right to protect itself. A government faced with prolonged, simultaneous, apparently coordinated riots disrupting the entire nation to the point where the government feared its very existence was in jeopardy would take many actions which in calmer times would never be considered. "The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and . . . his decision is conclusive upon all other persons."¹

¹Decision of the United States Supreme Court, Martin vs Mott (1827).

What would happen in the Armed Forces in a situation such as that described in the preceding pages? The military services have not been immune to the social upheaval and confusion which has swept the rest of the nation--far from it. There have been racial incidents at State-side posts and in overseas theaters--and in every branch of the Armed Forces. The revolt against authority which characterizes much of the contemporary civilian scene is manifesting itself in the armed forces by an alarmingly serious attack on the traditional concept of military discipline.

On 8 December 1969 twenty black marines were returned from duty in the Mediterranean for alleged participation in a series of all-black and unauthorized meetings. One of the men who was returned had refused to continue to take or give orders as a Marine sergeant because he had returned from Vietnam and found that "Negroes are still suffering from discrimination."² The Negroes had formed a committee so that future black grievances could be presented by a group rather than an individual. "We want change; we are as much a part of the black revolution as anyone else."

A Congressional Committee investigating racial incidents among Marines at Camp Lejeune, N.C. is reported to have found "that inter-racial trouble in the services is more widespread than has been conceded up to now. Some unsubstantiated press reports, in fact, allege that Service personnel at some installations have taken to keeping loaded

²New York Times, December 8, 1969.

arms and other weapons nearby to protect themselves in case of assault attempts."³

When elements of their unit were ordered to Chicago for riot duty during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, a group of Negro soldiers refused to go on riot duty against blacks. They were charged with willful disobedience and some elements of the press criticized the Army for overreacting.

On 14 October 1968 twenty-seven prisoners at the Presidio stockade sat down in a circle in the exercise area of the stockade and began to sing and chant, reportedly to protest the death of a prisoner who had been shot and killed the previous day while trying to escape. The prisoners refused to obey the repeated orders of noncommissioned and commissioned officers to report to their designated places for the day's work. Although the seriousness of their action was carefully explained to them, the 27 prisoners continued to refuse to obey all orders. The action of the prisoners clearly constituted mutiny as defined by presidential executive order and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the Army charged each with mutiny. A large segment of the press and some members of Congress immediately launched a violent attack on the Army for mishandling what the critics apparently regarded as a youthful prank.

Underground newspapers have appeared at many military installations. All are unanimous in castigating the military; all violently oppose the American position in Vietnam. The papers urge soldiers to

³Armed Forces Journal, December 6, 1969, p. 9.

form a union; they describe ways to beat courts martial charges; offer free civilian legal aid; encourage soldiers to participate in antiwar demonstrations; urge deliberate mistakes on the part of clerks; do everything possible to foul up the normal routine of the post.

The AWOL rate is higher than it has ever been. Sweden and Canada have sizeable colonies of American deserters and draft dodgers, many of whom are receiving financial assistance from individuals and organizations within the United States.

Hardly an Army post is free of antimilitary graffiti, the most popular of which is F_____ the Army (FTA).

Does all this mean that the Armed Forces could not be counted upon if committed to put down violence and revolution in the United States? No, it does not, although it is likely that there would be some local repetitions of the Fort Hood incident. The overwhelming majority of the Armed Forces could be expected to respond as Americans have historically done to protect the Nation, though it would be impossible to measure the soul-searing inner conflict that would be suffered by many soldiers. The soldier knows that the nation is in a crisis of authority. He may not put it in the rhetoric of the political scientist or sociologist, but the soldier knows as surely as does the civilian that unrestricted violence could lead to totalitarianism and he wants no part of it.

Periot measures to eliminate social inequities and racial discriminations are the best means of avoiding racial conflict, and it is here that the armed forces offer a principal hope for eventual solution of the racial problem. The services are integrated de facto as well as de jure. While it would be naive to suggest there are no prejudices among

servicemen, it would be equally inappropriate to overlook the great strides toward true equality that have been made since President Truman desegregated the services on 26 July 1948. Though the Negro in service must suffer most of the humiliations of a Negro civilian when he is off post, his life in uniform is considerably better than that of his civilian counterpart. The Armed Forces have reason to be proud of their record: it could well serve as a model for the rest of our society. The record of achievement of the Negro serviceman is the best antidote for the militant agitator. We are far from being able to rest on our record of achievement, however. Complacency is the greatest threat to effective racial equality in the armed forces. To be prejudiced requires little or no effort: it is the path of least resistance and can serve as a convenient excuse for any number of failures--both black and white. One must work hard and unceasingly to become and remain unprejudiced, but for the officer and noncommissioned officer there is positively no acceptable alternative.


Absolutely fair and equal treatment of all subordinates is the military leader's best insurance against racial problems. It is not a new idea: it just needs to be universally applied. The commander cannot hope to achieve "fair and equal" treatment by living in virtual isolation from his troops: he must know in intimate detail every facet of the troops' daily routine. All leaders must have at least a basic knowledge of the nature of prejudice and the part it plays in today's world. It is vitally important that the newly inducted soldier not be exposed to prejudiced and unequal treatment. On-duty courses taught by competent civilian educators could (and should) be established at all major training

centers. Attendance should be mandatory for all unit commanders, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants assigned to BCT or AIT units. It is conceded that such a study program would tax an already hard-working cadre, but the long-term benefits would more than compensate for any temporary hardship. Every leader must learn to listen and must convince his subordinates of his willingness to hear legitimate complaints and constructive comments. GI unions or racial coalition groups have a difficult time getting started in units where every soldier is convinced that his leaders are unprejudiced, competent, and reasonable men.

Just as prejudice has been largely overcome in the Armed Forces, it can be as successfully overcome in our entire society. The situation is not simple: it is a complex, social phenomenon involving many different kinds of action by different kinds of participants.

Prejudice, conflict, and violence need to be replaced by more effective day-to-day negotiations, with visible results. Not only prejudice but poverty, social isolation, and discrimination must be vigorously attacked with a great commitment of our total resources; not with fragmented, partial effort, but with national programs specifically designed to bring social peace. It will not be easy but it can no longer be delayed.

Failure to recognize the urgency of the racial imperative would be suicidal--our survival as a free nation is at stake.


LOUIS O. GIUFFRIDA
COL, MPC

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